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Frank Jackson (1998: 56-86) argues that this godsend is illusory. The necessary a posteriori bridge laws must follow a priori from contingent a posteriori premisses that are made true by the fundamental way the world is. To illustrate the deductive pattern: In this way, Jackson argues (1998: 57) that 'physicalists, qua holders of a metaphysical view, are committed to the logical thesis of the a priori deducibility of the psychological way things are from the physical way things are'. 3 To generalize: all of us are committed to the a priori deducibility of the manifest way things are from the fundamental way things are (whatever that may be). Conceptual analysis, to provide the a priori premiss of the deduction, is after all an indispensable part of the solution to the location problem.
We need a way to get from contingent truths, supervenient on the fundamental way things are, to the necessary a posteriori bridge laws. What it takes to do the job, or so it seems, is a general result that every necessary a posteriori truth is a priori deducible from a contingent truth. That was proved long ago. Indeed something stronger was proved: Tharp's third 'theorem of metaphysics', which states that every truth is a priori equivalent to a contingent truth. The proof is simple. It makes no use of the contentious apparatus of A-intensions versus C-intensions (also known as diagonal versus horizontal intensions, Stalnaker 1978; or primary versus secondary intensions, Chalmers 1996: 56-65).
It's no wonder that Tharp's third theorem is little known. When first proved, it was announced only in an abstract in a mathematics journal (Tharp 1974) . Only fifteen years later was it published in full, posthumously, in a philosophy journal (Tharp 1989: 212) . What's more, when at last it was published, the proof was garbled by a pair of confusing typographical errors. 4 Here is the proof. (I simplify: Tharp's proof also covered the a priori equivalence of any falsehood to a contingent falsehood.) First, pick once watery stuff is water; 'Water is H 2 O' and 'The watery stuff is H 2 O' come out as analytically equivalent contingent a posteriori truths. I note also that being 'watery' is not just a matter of being colourless, tasteless, liquid, life-supporting etc.; it is also a matter of being abundant hereabouts, being an object of our acquaintance, and being the causal source of our tokens of 'water'. Finally, I ignore qualifications to the contingent a posteriori premiss: some watery stuff is very impure H 2 O; sometimes the hydrogen is deuterium or tritium; and some H 2 O, such as ice or steam, is not altogether watery. 3 Contraposing the same argument, anyone committed to denying the a priori deducibility of the psychological way things are from the physical way things are is thereby committed to denying physicalism (Chalmers 1996: 56-65, 131-34, 166) . 4 Page 212, line 14-up: the biconditional should be 'j iff p'. Line 12-up should be '… y is contingent …'.
and for all some arbitrarily chosen contingent a priori truth. Let it be M: 'the metre bar is one metre long'. Let j be any truth: necessary or contingent, a priori or a posteriori. Case 1: j is contingent. Then it is a priori equivalent to a contingent truth, namely itself. Case 2: j is necessary. Consider the biconditional 'j iff M'. Since M is contingent and j is necessary, the biconditional is contingent. Since M and j are both true, the biconditional is true. Since M is a priori, j is a priori equivalent to the biconditional. In either case, j is a priori equivalent to a contingent truth. QED. We may note as well that if j is a posteriori, then so is the biconditional. Shall we conclude that Jackson proved his point in a needlessly difficult way, with needless recourse to contentious apparatus? Not at all! The real lesson is that what Jackson needs, and what he gives us, goes beyond the a priori deducibility of necessary a priori bridge laws from contingent premisses. What Tharp offers as the contingent truth that is a priori equivalent to 'Water is H 2 O' is 'Water is H 2 O iff the metre bar is one metre long'. Contingent, sure enough; and a posteriori as well. But in no way does it help us locate water within fundamental reality. What Jackson offers is 'The watery stuff is H 2 O'. That solves the location problem for the watery stuff, which is only a short a priori step away from solving the location problem for water. Jackson has supplemented Tharp's third theorem with a result that has far more bearing on the location problem: every a posteriori truth is a priori equivalent to a contingent a posteriori truth whose C-intension is the same at all worlds, and hence is the same as its A-intension.
